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When two elephants fight, it's always the grass that gets hurt!
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1. E. F. Roots, International Agreements to Prohibit or Control Modification of
the Environment for Military Purposes: An Historical Overview and Comments on
Current Issues, in VERIFICATION REsEARCH UNIT, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARmAm
DIVIsION, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, VERIFYING OBLu-
GATIONS RESPECTING ARms CONTROL AND THE ENVIRONMENT. A PosT GuLF WARt
ASSEssmENT 13, 23 (H. Bruno Schiefer ed., 1992) [hereinafter VERIFYING OBLIGA-
TIONS].
2. Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of
the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law, 21 DENY. J. INT'L L
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INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf War stands as a prime example of deliberate envi-
ronmental modification for military purposes? In January 1991, the first
news reports suggested that prior to the conflict, Iraqi ground forces
ignited 150 oil installations.4 Subsequently, by war's end, Iraqi forces
set fire to 732 wells.' Moreover, on January 24, 1991, Saudi Arabian
sources reported that 1.5 million barrels of crude oil had been dumped
into the Persian Gulf.6
The effects of the purposeful torching of oil wells in Kuwait repre-
sent the State's most pressing environmental concerns. One report sug-
gested that the fires released numerous toxins, including the emission of
sulphur dioxide and hydrogen sulphide from the burning oil fields.7 Fur-
thermore, the damage to marine life has been overwhelming. Toxic
hydrocarbons and sediments affected seagrass beds, which provide nurs-
ery grounds for commercial shrimp.' The ensuing oil slick devastated
the coral reef communities, disrupting the sensitive ecological system.9
Finally, blue-green algae, which provides nutrients to fish and crusta-
& POL'Y 215, 259 (1993).
3. See Maj. Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental
Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) (discussing the ramifications of Sadam Hussein's strategy includ-
ing the call for a Fifth Geneva Convention).
4. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, KuwArr: REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE KUwAI IN-
FRASTRUCTURE DURING THE IRAQI OCCUPATION at 27, U.N. Doc. DPI/I157 (1991)
[hereinafter KUWAIT REPORT].
5. See Mark Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern
Warfare: Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 479, 480 (1993) (stating Director of the Oil Publication Bulletin, Richard
Golob's estimate of the number of oil wells that Iraqi soldiers ignited).
6. David C. Morrison, War on the Environment, NAT'L. J., March 2, 1991, at
536.
7. KUWAIT REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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ceans, suffered the deleterious effects of Iraq's deliberate environmental
modification.'"
The use of the environment as a target in times of armed conflict is
not a new phenomenon. As early as 146 B.C., Roman troops razed the
city of Carthage and salted the surrounding earth to sterilize the soil."
Strategists researched other means of denying territory to the enemy
during World War H, including a strategy of saturation bombing utiliz-
ing Anthrax spores that would have killed an estimated fifty percent of
the populations and contaminated the terrain enough to force evacua-
tion. 2
The ability to use the environment as an instrument of war increases
with technological capability. 3 Thus, armed forces only recently ac-
quired the ability, with the sophistication of armaments, to control atmo-
spheric, tectonic, and biotic factors of the environment for military pur-
poses. 4
In terms of atmospheric manipulations, one commentator suggested
that altering the upper atmosphere and affecting its electrical properties
would allow for the disruption of enemy communications. 5 Moreover,
it is an imminent possibility to be able to open a temporary hole in the
ozone layer through controlled releases of a bromide compound over a
specified area of enemy territory thereby permitting levels of ultraviolet
radiation to penetrate and injure enemy forces.' 6
Operation Ranch Hand offers strikingly real evidence of the potential
for deliberate modification of the land and vegetation. The United States
instituted Operation Ranch Hand during the Vietnam War for the pur-
pose of destroying vegetation used by the enemy as cover and as a
source of sustenance.: Appraisers estimated that the chemical-based
incendiary weapons, such as Agent Orange, have caused destruction of
eight percent of the region's croplands, fourteen percent of its forests,
10. Id. The blue-green algae covers much of the mud flats which provide feeding
grounds for numerous species of wading birds. As a result of the oil slick, it is esti-
mated that the fauna of worms and crustaceans will be killed, thus further disrupting
the fragile ecosystem. Id.
11. Morrison, supra note 6, at 536.
12. Id.
13. Arthur H. Westing, Environmental varfare, 15 ENvTL L 645, 646 (1985).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 648.
16. Id.
17. Morrison, supra note 6, at 536.
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and half of its swamp areas. 8 Furthermore, the introduction of microor-
ganisms into the region threatened the balance of the ecosystem."'
The foregoing illustrates the realistic potential to use the environment
as a target of military operations. In many of the examples, the intro-
duction of chemical and biological toxins into the ecosystem instigated
the deliberate environmental modification. Given this foreboding premo-
nition, is it possible to contain or diminish the option of purposeful
environmental destruction through the use of biological and chemical
weaponry? Furthermore, does international law provide any framework
for determining the legality of such military operations?
This Article examines the current norms and standards that exist in
international law to confront these issues." To understand the complex-
ity of the problem, this Article first addresses the general principles sur-
rounding state responsibility for environmental damage by surveying the
various legal regimes established under international environmental law.
The subsequent sections scrutinize the current laws of armed conflict
and analyze whether they provide adequate environmental protection and
curtail the use of weaponry based on chemical and biological toxins.
This Article also examines the legality of the means and methods of
using biological and chemical agents in times of war against the envi-
18. Id. See HERBICIDES IN WAR: THE LONG-TERM ECOLOGICAL AND HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984) (providing a technical appraisal of the
effects of herbicides on the ecologies of terrestrial plants and animals, soil, and coast-
al, aquatic and marine life).
19. Westing, supra note 13, at 655.
20. This Article does not examine nuclear armaments. For related conventions,
see, e.g., South Pacific Nuclear Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, art. 3, 24 I.L.M. 1442,
1444 (refusing to encourage or assist in the possession or manufacture of nuclear
weapons); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 (ac-
knowledging our responsibility to preserve the Earth's seabed and according protection
from nuclear weapons); Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (prompting atomic research
for peaceful purposes); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
opened for signature, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610, U.N.T.S. 205 (vow-
ing not to place into orbit any vessels containing nuclear weapons); Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5,
1963, art. 1, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (proclaiming to agree to cease all
testing of weapons, including nuclear weapons); The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 12, 1959,
arts. 1, 5, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (committing the use of the continent of
Antarctica to peaceful purposes).
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ronment by focusing on established sources of law, including a discus-
sion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is currently facing
ratification in the domestic fora of member States. Finally, alternative
protective regimes are proffered. This Article concludes that the estab-
lished corpus of laws, at best, provides only limited coverage for envi-
ronmental protection in times of purposeful modification, and therefore,
a reaffirmation and reworking of this set of principles is necessary.
I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Man is both creature and molder of his environment, which gives him
physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, mor-
al, social, and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous evolution of the
human race on this planet a stage has been reached when through rapid
acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to
transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented
scale.2'
In large measure, the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference)' represents the
birth of international environmental law. In its form and substance, the
conference established a working-paradigm for global recognition of
environmental issues, and instituted the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP).' Moreover, the Conference issued twenty-six non-
binding principles within its Declaration, focusing on environmental
protection."
Despite its lack of authority, the Stockholm Declaration is significant
for its recognition of state responsibility for environmental damage.'
Principle 21 dictates that States may conduct activities within their bor-
ders, such as "exploit[ing] their own resources," but that they have the
further duty to prevent their actions from damaging other States.h
21. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, Section I of the
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id.
26. Principle 21 States that
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State responsibility for environmental destruction, as Principle 21
dictates, constitutes customary international law.' As a result, following
the Stockholm Conference, some States sought to implement the princi-
ples of its Declaration while recognizing the need to elaborate on mea-
sures to conserve natural resources considered necessary to humanity. 8
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21, princ. 21.
27. See, e.g., Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward
a Crime of Geocide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 329-40 (1993)
(discussing the evolution of international common law and recognizing the responsi-
bility of States to protect the environment); Caggiano, supra note 5, at 479 (explain-
ing that the Stockholm Declaration addresses the duties and responsibilities of nations
in wartime to protect the environment); Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environ-
mental Damage: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67,
70 (1992) (highlighting Principle 21 as the defining source for determining whether a
State is responsible for an environmentally injurious act). Furthermore, prior to its
explicit delineation in the Stockholm Declaration, litigators relied on the notion of
state responsibility in litigation concerning environmental despoilment. Trail Smelter
Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941) reprinted
in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) (initial opinion) and 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684
(1941) (final decision). The case relates to injuries suffered by farmers resulting from
emissions of sulphur dioxide from a smelting plant in British Columbia. Id. The Arbi-
tral Tribunal concluded that "no state has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of an-
other or the properties of another person therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 716.
Custom is an important source of international law. Statute of the ICJ, Art. 38
(b), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993 at 25 (stating that "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law," is deemed a source of international
law of which the ICJ shall apply). Often times, there exists a gradual transformation
of treaty law into customary law evidenced by municipal enactments passed by States
as standards of conduct. If other States find such codifications acceptable, the munici-
pal statutes tend to be interpreted as giving rise to generally accepted usages. More-
over, it is possible that further refinements of this established custom may undergo
subsequent development by way of multilateral treaties. Georg Schwarzenberger, Inter-
national Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, v. 2, The Law of
Armed Conflict, at 15 (1968). See Jonathan I. Charney, International Agreements and
the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REv. 971 (1986)
(analyzing the evolution of treaty agreements into international customary law).
28. ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
46 (1991).
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Given this generalized push, the United Nations promulgated the World
Charter for Nature in 1982.29
The Preamble of the Charter expresses several fundamental concepts:
(1) "mankind is a part of nature and life depends on the uninterrupted
functioning of natural systems to ensure the supply of energy and nutri-
ents;" and (2) "civilization is rooted in nature, which has shaped human
culture. . . and living in harmony with nature gives man the best op-
portunities for the development of his creativity.""!O Yet, implicit in this,
is the recognition that "man can alter nature and exhaust natural resourc-
es by his action or its consequences and, therefore, must fully recognize
the urgency of maintaining the stability and quality of nature and of
conserving natural resources."'" Furthermore, "nature shall be respected
and its essential processes shall not be impaired."' This intimates a
continuation of the Stockholm Declaration's espoused principle that
humanity must respect the environment and take responsibility for state
action that impairs its flourishing.3
Similar to the Stockholm Declaration, the principles of the World
Charter are not codified into binding legal authority.' Nevertheless, it
is indicative of prevailing notions and the direction that international
environmental law is taking."
The 1989 Declaration of the Hague on the Environment issued a
mandate similar to that of its predecessors.' The Declaration, adopted
by twenty-four States, supported the right to a healthy environment.3
According to Paragraph 5, "remedies to be sought involve not only the
fundamental duty to preserve the ecosystem but also the right to live in
dignity in a viable global environment." The scope of this particular
Declaration included a proposal for the fashioning of an international
29. World Charter for Nature, U.N. GAOR 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21 at 7,
U.N. Doe. A/Resf37/7, reprinted in, 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983) [hereinafter World Charter
for Nature].
30. Id. annex.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21, § I (creating a set of goals for
nations to follow to preserve the environment).
34. Id. at § II.
35. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (indicating that U.N. declara-
tions and resolutions are not binding).
36. Declaration of the Hague on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.LM.
1308.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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organization within the United Nations framework, in order to curtail
state activities causing pollution.39
The most significant recent event concerning international environ-
mental law occurred with the promulgation of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development in 1992.' Many of its twenty seven
Principles restate notions found in its predecessors and attempt to build
upon them. According to Principle 1, "human beings are the center of
concerns for sustainable development, . . . [and] are entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature."'" Furthermore, Principle 2
embodies the notion of state responsibility, which it carried over from
the Stockholm Declaration.42 The notion of state responsibility, as
found in the Rio Declaration, allows for the recognition of state liability
for activities that harm the environment.43 According to Principle 13,
"states shall . . . cooperate in an expeditious and more determined man-
ner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensa-
tion for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction."'
The International Law Commission (ILC) in its "Draft Articles on
State Responsibility" further develops many of the principles concerning
state responsibility, as embodied in the conventional sources of intema-
tional environmental law discussed in this section.45 For purposes of
39. The International Court of Justice would have authority to mandate compli-
ance with such agreements and settle international environmental disputes. Id. In
many ways, however, it is difficult to assert that such a remedy is viable. This diffi-
culty is mainly due to the failure of States to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in
most matters. See Berat, supra note 27, at 334-36 (noting the improbability that the
ICJ will have jurisdiction in environmental disputes to divert the on-going environ-
mental assault).
40. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
41. Id. princ. 1.
42. Principle 2 states that
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Id. princ. 2.
43. Id. princs. 13-15.
44. Id. princ. 13.
45. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION's DRAFT ARTIcLEs ON STATE RE-
800 [VOL. 11:5
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this section, the set of thirty-five principles, which constitute the Draft
Articles, relates to the responsibility of States for internationally wrong-
ful acts."
In summary, this brief history of international environmental law
illustrates the existence of humanity's right to be secure in a habitable
environment. Moreover, as the Stockholm Declaration and its progeny
have indicated, States must take responsibility for their actions and ac-
tivities that cause destruction to the natural environment.' Despite the
non-binding status of the particular declarations, there is, nevertheless,
evidence that the right to a habitable environment and state responsibili-
ty have become fixed principles within customary international law.'
A. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW TO MODERN WARFARE
International environmental law has an impact on modem warfare.
According to the Stockholm Declaration "[m]an and his environment
must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of
SPONSIBILITY (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991) [hereinafter ILC DRAFT ARTICLES].
46. Id. at 169. A more in-depth discussion of the ILC Draft Articles is available
infra, Section IA, in relation to the application of the principle of state responsibility
to modem warfare.
47. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21, art. 21 (stating in Principle 2 that
"states have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction").
48. See, e.g., Berat, supra note 27, at 338-40 (discussing the right to a healthy
environment as deserving the status of jus cogens); Caggiano, supra note 5, at 500-03
(noting the world community's recognition of state responsibility to protect the envi-
ronment from the effects of war); Leibler, supra note 27, at 70 (asserting that state
responsibility for environmental damage has become a customary norm in international
law).
Specific examples of state responsibility can be found in conventional sources.
See, e.g., 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe
A.CONF.621122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFicIAL TEXT OF THE UNIrr NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA wrrH ANNExES AND INDEX, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.V.5 (1983) (mandating in Article 235(1) that "states are responsible for the
fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation
of the marine environment"); Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, reprinted in 18 LL.M. 1442 (dictating that States
have the responsibility to limit air pollution); Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 27, 1985, reprinted in 26 lL.M. 1516
(recommending that States should take appropriate measure to protect the ozone lay-
er).
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mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the
relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction
of such weapons."4 9 Both the World Charter for Nature and the Rio
Declaration take positions similar to the Stockholm Declaration. As a
general principle, the World Charter for Nature dictates that "nature
shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile
activities."'5 Furthermore, the Rio Declaration indicates that intemation-
al law should guide States to protect the environment in wartime and
that States will, when necessary, reevaluate this framework.5 Although
these principles are not binding on States,52 the widespread approval of
these resolutions indicates that state responsibility applies in modem
warfare.
53
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide additional evidence
of States' accountability for their environmental destruction."4 As a gen-
eral principle, the ILC Draft Articles proclaim that "every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State. 55 Moreover, the elements necessary to constitute an "intemation-
49. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 21, princ. 26.
50. World Charter for Nature, supra note 29, General Princs.
51. Rio Declaration, supra note 40, princ. 24 (stating that "[w]arfare is inherently
destructive of sustainable development" and that "[s]tates shall therefore respect inter-
national law providing for the protection of the environment in times of armed con-
flict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.").
52. Leibler, supra note 27, at 70 (expressing that the United Nation's Declara-
tions are not legally binding); Caggiano, supra note 5, at 502 (indicating that the
General Assembly Resolutions are merely recommendations and not per se legal re-
strictions); see U.N. CHARTER art. 14 reprinted in 1970 U.N.Y.B. 1001, 1003, U.N.
Sales No. E.72.I.1 (providing that the "General Assembly may recommend measures
for peaceful adjustment of any situation").
53. See Caggiano, supra note 5, at 503 (holding States accountable for the ef-
fects of modem warfare); Leibler, supra note 27, at 75 (concluding that state respon-
sibility for environmental damage applies at wartime).
54. ILC DRAFr ARTICLES, supra note 45.
55. Id. art. 1. Commentary to the Draft principles affirms that the principles of
international responsibility of States is based on state practice and judicial decisions.
Id. In particular, the ILC cites as authority such cases as S.S. Wimbledon (France,
G.B., Jap., It. v. Germany), 1923 P.C.IJ., (ser. A) No. 1, at 15 (holding Germany
internationally responsible to uphold treaty obligations); Case Concerning the Factory
at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (finding that a
state is internationally responsible not to breach a convention); Corfu Channel Case
(United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.CJ. 23 (concluding that Albania is responsible
under international law for expositions in Albanian waters damaging U.K. vessels and
killing U.K. seamen).
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ally wrongful act" include "conduct consisting of an act or omis-
sion ... attributable to the State under international law" that "consti-
tutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.""
The ILC Draft Articles extend further by explicitly delineating inter-
national crimes and international delicts." In particular, Article 19 char-
acterizes an international crime, as a "breach by a State of an interna-
tional obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests
of the international community," which may result from a breach of the
obligation of "safeguarding and preserv[ing] ... the human environ-
ment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or
of the seas." 8
The ILC Draft Articles elaborate on the customary principles es-
poused by the Stockholm Declaration and its progeny. At least one com-
mentator criticized the ILC Draft Articles, however, for not effectively
deterring environmental damage in times of war.59 One critic argued
that state responsibility under the ILC Draft Articles merely imposes a
threat of post-war financial obligations that States virtually overlook in
order to fulfill legitimate military objectives.' In other words, the ben-
efits of effectively meeting military objectives and conducting operations
during armed conflicts outweighs the economic costs involved in pro-
tecting the environment.
Assuming international law addresses State responsibility for environ-
mental destruction, the issue arises whether state responsibility realisti-
cally applies to deliberate environmental modification. In many instanc-
es, the law affords military commanders wide latitude in targeting and
operations, much to the detriment of the environment. As a result, this
Article examines other regimes for environmental protection.
56. ILC DRAFr ARTICLES, supra note 45, at 49.
57. See id. at 179 (stating in Paragraph I that "[a]n act of a State which con-
stitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, re-
gardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached"). Furthermore, "[a]n interna-
tionally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole
constitutes an international crime." ld.
58. Id. at 179-80.
59. Leibler, supra note 27, at 77 (indicating that the general principle of state
responsibility will not play a primary deterrent role during war, but rather, will serve
its function in the context of post-war reparations).
60. Id.
1996] 803
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B. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN ACTION:
PREVENTING HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION
The U.S. use of incendiary weapons in Vietnam and reports of U.S.
attempts to manipulate weather in Indo-China to hamper land movement
in North Vietnam provided the catalyst for the promulgation of the 1977
United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (En-Mod).6'
Furthermore, the principles of state responsibility that the Stockholm
Declaration and its progeny espoused provide a theoretical basis for the
creation of En-Mod.62 This section examines the scope of the Conven-
tion and questions whether En-Mod itself is enough to curtail deliberate
environmental damage. To advance that inquiry, this section examines
the terms and prohibitions under the convention, as well as its ultimate
utility in altering state actions and behavior in times of war.
Prior to framing En-Mod, various States studied and examined the
plausible scope of the Convention.63 One particular analysis reviewed
61. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S.
152, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 88 [hereinafter En-Mod], also reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ON TiH LAW OF WAR 377-85 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS]. According to E. F. Roots, further background of En-Mod is
based on non-military concerns including technological modification, including cloud
seeding by both the United States and Canada. Roots, supra note 1, at 13.
62. Cf. Leibler, supra note 27, at 82 (outlining the obligations En-Mod places on
States not to engage in military or other activities hostile to the environment); Roots,
supra note 1, at 17 (discussing the 1972 U.N. Stockholm Conference's position stating
that domestic actions should not adversely affect other State's environments).
63. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 377 (citing the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit
in Moscow on July 3, 1974 where the United States and U.S.S.R. agreed to consider
the dangers of environmental warfare); Roots, supra note 1, at 18-20 (explaining
Canada's response in the negotiations to formulate an environmental modification
regime was to establish a scientific group to examine and assess the plausibility and
reality of the potential hostile uses of the environment). This assessment included
establishing which categories of deliberate environmental modification might be useful
for military purposes, and what methods could become potential instruments of war-
fare in the near future. Id. at 18-19. See also WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILI-
TARY IMPACT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1980) (citing Ern Mdszdros, Techniques for Manipulating the
Atmosphere, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY AP-
PRAISAL 13 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984) and Hallan C. Noltimier, Techniques for
Manipulating the Geosphere, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL
AND POLICY APPRAISAL, at 25 (examining the effects of warfare on temperate, tropi-
cal, desert, and arctic regions, islands, and the ocean).
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five main categories of potential environmental modification targets,'
including the environmental effects of nuclear warfare; deliberate modifi-
cation of the weather for purposes of causing events such as drought,
forest fires, and climatological changes;' modification of ecosystems
including forest destruction and soil contamination;' modification of
geophysical processes such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions;67 and
modification of ocean conditions, such as alterations affecting currents
and causing persistent fog.'
Given these possibilities and concerns, Article I of the agreement
enunciates the central obligation of each state to not "engage in military
or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party." 9 Furthermore, Article II
defines "environmental modification techniques" as "any technique for
changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural process-the dy-
64. See Roots, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing the five-category analysis of po-
tential environmental targets).
65. ld. at 29-30 (examining the growing practice of artificially-induced weather
modification). This practice has led to the possibility of localized "rain-making,"
which in principle could be used to enhance rainfall or snowfall in selected areas in
order to increase the chance of avalanches and major floods in enemy territory. Id.
Moreover, there may come a time when the use of toxic chemicals in order to form
acid precipitation or destroy the stratospheric ozone layer will alter atmospheric chem-
istry. Id.
66. Id. This category includes scorched earth actions such as the intentional de-
struction of forests and farm lands in Finland and Norway during the Second World
War, and deliberate defoliation of forests during the Vietnam War. Id. In addition,
another important aspect of this subject is the possibility of biological warfare intro-
ducing human-influenced biological threats or nuisances into the ecological system of
targeted States. Id. Examples of biological warfare include introducing bee parasites to
destroy bee populations in areas where they are essential to pollinate vital crops, and
creating "red tide" toxic algae that causes damage to coastal regions. Id. at 26-27, 31.
67. Id. at 25. Although this modification may seem more like science fiction than
reality, theoretically, States can use both earthquakes and tsunamis for military purpos-
es. Despite the fact that most earthquakes occur in localized, well-defined locations,
there are a number of "trouble spots" around the world where military tensions are
high that are also prone to earthquakes. Thus the temptation for States to use earth-
quakes for military purposes exists. Id.
68. ld. at 32. A vital military strategy may utilize changes in ocean currents and
marine conditions, given the distinct changes in oceanic characteristics such as global
warming, changes in precipitation, and river runoff. The continuity and strength of the
Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic Ocean, and in the ice conditions and drift patterns
in the waters near Greenland and north of Russia, are foreseeable military targets. Id.
69. En-Mod, supra note 61, art. 1.
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namics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, litho-
sphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space."7
Semantically, the Articles imply that the modification must be large-
scale." A Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Un-
derstanding (CCD Understanding) opined that examples of large-scale
modification included: "earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the ecological
balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation,
cyclones of various types, and tornadic storms); changes in climate
patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the states of the ozone
layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere." '
The En-Mod Convention defines the quantum of damage necessary to
fall within its scope as "widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects.""'
The disjunctive phrasing of the effect is important, meaning the presence
of any one of these elements will suffice.74 The problem, however, cen-
ters on the interpretation of each of the elements, since the Convention
itself does not define them.7" Another CCD Understanding accompany-
ing Article I does, however, provide the following:
(a) "Widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred
square kilometers;
(b) "Long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a
season;
(c) "Severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human
life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended
exclusively for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the inter-
70. Id. art. 2.
71. Leibler, supra note 27, at 82-83.
72. See Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 377 [hereinafter Understanding I] and
Understanding II of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 378 [hereinafter Understanding II] (discussing the
types of environmental modification techniques within the scope of En-Mod); see also
supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the potential environmental
modification techniques that these targets pose).
73. En-Mod, supra note 61, art. 1. See Leibler, supra note 27, at 82 (detailing
the elements of Article 1).
74. Stephanie N. Simonds, Note, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protec-
tion: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165, 186
(1992); Leibler, supra note 27, at 82-83.
75. See Leibler, supra note 27, at 83 (expressing that Article 1 of En-Mod does
not indicate how severe or how widespread the damage must be).
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pretation of the same or similar terms if used in connection with any
other international agreement.16
All of the signatories to the En-Mod Convention have not necessarily
adopted this interpretation. For example, Turkey stated that "the
terms ... contained in the Convention need to be more clearly defined.
So long as this clarification is not made [Turkey] will be compelled to
interpret itself the terms in question and consequently it reserves the
right to do so as and when required."" The central obligation of the
En-Mod is also unclear regarding the phrase "as the means of destruc-
tion, damage or injury" because the phrase raises serious questions re-
garding an offending State's intention to cause the damage?3 On the
one hand, one interpretation of the phrase would allow a State to fully
escape responsibility by asserting a lack of intention in causing any of
the environmental damage.' On the other hand, if a State admits to
intentionally causing a portion of the environmental damage, the State
could also be liable for the excess amount of damage unforeseen or
unintended.'0 Nevertheless, at least one commentator suggests that the
international community should hold States responsible for any damage
whether or not intentional."' Moreover, even if States could establish a
defined threshold or quantum of damage, critics have identified an exac-
erbating problem: the subjective aspect of determining when a breach of
duty actually occurs.' In other words, it is unclear who will judge the
degree of severity or the degree to which the environmental modification
was a deliberate act for hostile purposes. Moreover, it is unclear whether
the party who makes the judgment will judge the acts separately, in
terms of single military operations or campaigns, or whether it will
weigh cumulative effects. As a result, the vague terminology of En-Mod
undermines its value because it does not provide clear standards by
which to judge state actions in wartime.
Furthermore, En-Mod has failed to actively alter state behavior in
times of armed conflict. Only after the modification occurs will the
76. See Understanding I, supra note 72, at 377-78 (defining the terms "wide-
spread," "long-lasting," and "severe").
77. Leibler, supra note 27, at 83.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. E. F. Roots, The Enmod Convention and Related International Agreements:
The Changed Setting in Which They Must Operate, in VERIFYING OBLIGATIONS, supra
note 1, at 203.
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governing body determine whether a State breached the Convention;
therefore, there is some question as to whether the Convention acts to
prevent deliberate environmental modification.83 Moreover, the Conven-
tion prohibits only the use of the techniques, not research."4 Thus, a
State may continually develop methods to modify the environment for
military purposes." Finally, the question remains as to whom the Con-
vention applies.86 For example, upon accession to En-Mod, Kuwait stat-
ed that the Convention only binds it toward signatory States, and that
Kuwait's obligations under En-Mod end with respect to a hostile State
that does not abide by the Convention's prohibitions.'
Finally, the extent of responsibility for breaches of En-Mod merits
consideration. The terms of the Convention do not provide any obliga-
tion for remedial measures, such as reparation or monetary compensa-
tion.8" Instead, Article 5(2) requires the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral to convene a Consultative Committee of Experts at the request of
any State. 9 Yet, critics argue that the Consultative Committee lacks
any substantive authority.' As a result, these critics view the lack of
enforcement for breaches of En-Mod as compounding the ineffectiveness
of the Convention.9'
The ambiguity in language, divergence in interpretations, and the lack
of enforcement measures resulted in few States ratifying En-Mod.'
83. Id.
84. Simonds, supra note 74, at 186-87.
85. Id. at 186-87. Moreover, Party States may arguably use environmental tech-
niques against Non-party States, and perhaps against a State's own population without
violating the terms of En-Mod. Id.
86. See id. at 187 (stating that environmental modification techniques may be
used against non-party States and perhaps a state's own population).
87. En-Mod, supra note 61, Reservations.
88. See Leibler, supra note 27, at 84 (discussing the responsibility of States
under the En-Mod Convention); see also Simonds, supra note 74, at 187 (explaining
how En-Mod Convention's investigatory body is powerless and how a complaining
State must sue an offending State before the Convention takes action).
89. En-Mod, supra note 61, art. 5(2).
90. See Simonds, supra note 74, at 187 (stating that the Consultative Committee
of Experts is relatively powerless); Leibler, supra note 27, at 84 (indicating that the
committee is not authorized to draw legal conclusions, vote on matters of substance,
or impose liability).
91. Leibler, supra note 27, at 84.
92. Simonds, supra note 74, at 187. As of June 1994, only 68 States have rati-
fied En-Mod. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST
OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1994 (1994).
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Despite the concerns and criticisms of the Convention, its form and
substance remain intact after several review conferences. The follow-
ing sections determine whether States can more efficiently curtail envi-
ronmental modification and the use of the environment as a weapon of
war by using other limiting principles and organs.
II. CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The codification of norms and standards concerning armed conflict
reinforces the customary principles of international law that States recog-
nize.94 These customary principles have played a key role in the devel-
opment of the conventional sources that comprise the international laws
of armed conflict.95 Thus, examining these customs and their relevant
limitations on the waging of war is of great importance.' The Martens
Clause, which first appeared in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Con-
vention HI, has expressly enunciated the significance of custom govern-
ing the use of force. This provision states in part that "the high con-
tracting parties think it right to declare that ... populations and
belligerents remain under protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience."'7 Later codifications of law adopted similar lan-
guage, evidencing the relevance of this passage.' Most importantly, in
93. DOCUmENTS, supra note 61, at 378. The first review conference was held in
September 1984 in Geneva where no amendments were made by any state party. U.S.
Urges No Change in Environment Arms Treaty, Reuters, Sept. 15, 1992, available in
LEXIS, INTLAW Library, INT-NEWVS File. Moreover, in 1992, the State parties
favorably reviewed the content and form of the En-Mod Convention. Id. According to
U.S. delegate Michael Moodie, "[a]mendments are likely to do more harm than good.
whether they amend the treaty directly or have the functional effect of an amendment
through attempted reinterpretation." Id.
94. DocumENTS, supra note 61, at 4.
95. See Simonds, supra note 74, at 168-70 (explaining how the four customary
law principles of proportionality, humanity, discrimination, and military necessity regu-
late wartime conduct not addressed in treaties); Caggiano, supra note 5, at 498-500
(describing how the customary Law of War forbids the use of some tactics and weap-
ons, even if they are needed to win a war).
96. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes cus-
tomary international law).
97. DOCUimNTS, supra note 61, at 4.
98. Id. See Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
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times of armed conflict, combatants do not have an unlimited right to
adopt any means necessary to injure the enemy." The customary prin-
ciples of proportionality and discrimination adopt this fundamental prin-
ciple and form its foundation.
A. PROPORTIONALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
Proportionality, on the one hand, requires that the use of force be
relative to the objective sought."® In other words, the means the com-
batants employ in armed conflict must be balanced against the overall
strategic end or pursued objective. Discrimination, on the other hand,
incorporates "care in the selection of methods, of weaponry, and of tar-
gets."'0 ' Under this doctrine, strategy must distinguish those targets
that are legitimate military objectives from those that are civilian tar-
gets. ' 2 As a result, the principle of discrimination forbids the wanton
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, pmbl., reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 44
[hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV] (providing the text of the 1907 Hague Con-
vention IV). The 1907 Hague Convention provides for almost identical language in its
Preamble. Id. Furthermore, each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions borrows similar
terminology from the Marten's Clause and asserts that even if a party denounces the
Convention, this:
shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall
remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, art. 63, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS, supra note 61, at 171, 192; 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, art. 62, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 194, 213; 1949 Geneva
Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 216, 270; 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 158, reprinted in DOCUMENTS,
supra note 61, at 272, 325.
99. DocuMENTs, supra note 61, at 5.
100. See Caggiano, supra note 5, at 495 (explaining how the military means used
must be in proportion to the overall objective); Capt. William A. Wilcox, Jr., Envi-
ronmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 299, 303 (1993) (defining propor-
tionality as a balancing test with military objectives on the one hand, and unnecessary
suffering on the other).
101. DOcUMENTS, supra note 61, at 5.
102. Caggiano, supra note 5, at 495.
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attack of civilians." Arguably, this principle forbids acts or threats if
their primary purpose is to terrorize civilian populations."
Customary principles governing armed conflict, furthermore, transcend
the doctrines of proportionality and discrimination by amalgamating the
two to establish further sources of standards in times of war." Three
notions underlie these doctrines: (1) the principle of military necessity;
(2) the principle of humanity; and (3) the principle of chivalry."t The
definitions of these three notions are as follows:
1. Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the
law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of
the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical re-
sources may be applied.
2. The employment of any kind of degree of force not required for the
purpose of the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a mini-
mum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources is prohibited.
3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedients, and dishon-
orable conduct during armed conflict are forbidden."m
B. THE DoCTRINE OF MILITARY NECESSITY
Military necessity provides that "a combatant is justified in applying
any force necessary to secure complete submission of the enemy as soon
as possible-as long as the means are not prohibited by the provisions of
the law of war.'""°a This generalization can be parsed into four primary
elements:
1. That the use of force is capable of being and is in fact regulated by
the user,
2. That the use of force is necessary to achieve as quickly as possible the
partial or complete submission of the adversary;
3. That the force is no greater in effect on the enemy's personnel or
property than needed to achieve his prompt submission; and
4. That the force used is not otherwise prohibited.'"
103. Andrew D. McClintock, Comment, The Law of War: Coalition Attacks on
Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapon Storage and Production Facilities, 7 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 633, 646 (1993).
104. Id. at 646-47.
105. DOCUmNTs, supra note 61, at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. ,Wilcox, supra note 100, at 302.
109. McClintock, supra note 103, at 641.
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Commentators suggest that the doctrine of military necessity provides
a loophole or excuse for the justification of suspending the laws of
war."0 As this Article illustrates, this principle of military necessity,
found in codifications governing the waging of war, has allowed sub-
stantive exceptions to their prohibitions by providing combatants with a
means to suspend the laws of armed conflict.
C. UNNECESSARY SUFFERING: THE PRINCIPLES
OF HUMANITY AND CHIVALRY
The principles of humanity and chivalry gave rise to the concept of
unnecessary suffering."' In general, unnecessary suffering means that
military forces must take all necessary steps to avoid "inflicting super-
fluous suffering, injury or destruction that harm 'not actually necessary
for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.""" Thus, this
precept requires acceptance of the enemy's surrender; demands that
combatants not attack civilian objects; and forbids the use of armaments
that cause effects more deleterious than necessary. ' 3
Relevant Conventions include the customary principles governing the
law of armed conflict, underscoring their significance. In many instanc-
es, these precepts limit the rule's applicability to environmental protec-
tion, in terms of human concerns, rather than for environmental con-
cerns, and provide substantive loopholes for combatants to wage envi-
ronmental destruction.' "
110. See INGRID D. Da Lupis, THE LAW OF WAR 332-33 (1987) (explaining that
military necessity transforms acts that would normally be war crimes into legitimate
acts); McClintock, supra note 103, at 641-45 (discussing how the doctrine of military
necessity provides a justification for the use of force not prohibited by international
law, if such force is needed to secure military ends with the least amount of human
and economic injury).
111. See Wilcox, supra note 100, at 303 (explaining how the principles of chival-
ry and humanity prohibit use of dishonorable means or force not needed for military
purposes).
112. McClintock, supra note 103, at 645.
113. Id. at 645-46.
114. See Leibler, supra note 27, at 98-105 (stating that the inclusion of the cus-
tomary principles into the relevant conventions is to the environment's detriment);
Simonds, supra note 74, at 168-70 (positing that States may be able to justify envi-
ronmental damage by grounding their actions in terms of customary principle such as
military necessity).
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR
The collective set of conventions and agreements comprising the laws
of armed conflict incorporates many of the customary sources of interna-
tional law concerning the waging of war. The corpus of law in war, or
jus in bello, generally governs the conduct of hostilities."5 This set
contains a dichotomy of standards: the sections of "Hague" and "Gene-
va" international humanitarian laws. The "Hague," on the one hand,
seeks to set limits on the means and methods of warfare by restricting
weapon types and usage, as well as monitoring the tactics and the em-
ployment of general operational methods."6 On the other hand, "Gene-
va" law focuses on the protection of combatants and non-combat-
ants."
7
The following section introduces the relevant provisions of the inter-
national laws of armed conflict and the scope of protection afforded to
the environment. These provisions provide a framework for analyzing
the legality of deliberate environmental modification through the use of
biological and chemical toxins."' The provisions offer a limited scope
of protection in many of the specific instances that this section illus-
trates (that is, the protection of property; objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population; and works and installations contain-
ing dangerous forces). The laws of armed conflict are subject to diver-
gent interpretations of substantive language, and subject to exceptions as
in legitimate targeting through military necessity. The main purposes
behind the established conventions are to protect human life, and ame-
liorate human suffering. As a result, the conventions are devices that
provide only collateral or indirect protection to the environment." 9
115. HILARE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 189 (1992).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See discussion infra Section VI.C. (proposing that the legality of chemical
and biological weapons use rests partly on conventional sources which provide a
scope of protection for the environment); Leibler, supra note 27, at 96-117 (consider-
ing the conventional sources of the Laws of Armed Conflict as a basis for under-
standing deliberate environmental damage in times of war).
119. Cf GLEN PLANT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAw OF WAR 246-
47 (1992) (noting the need "to update existing Geneva and Hague Law to improve
the protection afforded to the environment....").
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A. PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH
THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY
1. The 1907 Hague Convention
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Convention IV) adopted in 1907 provides a degree of protection to the
environment. Yet, this Convention affords only a limited scope of pro-
tection. Moreover, in many respects the protection afforded to the envi-
ronment is merely incidental to humanitarian concerns.
The most relevant sections of Convention IV are Article 23(a), which
prohibits the use of poisonous weapons; Article 23(b), which prevents
the unnecessary suffering of civilians and combatants; and Article 23(g),
which provides limited preservation of property.' Though offering a
degree of protection to the environment, reliance on these provisions is
dubious. For example, Article 23(g) forbids the destruction of the
enemy's property "unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war."'' This provision fails to provide
adequate protection for several reasons. First, it is difficult to rely on
this provision because its application to a modem military context is
unclear. At least one commentator has suggested that historically the
Convention directs use of specific armaments, such as the poison weap-
ons Article 23(a) proscribes, more toward combatants instead of directly
toward the environment." As a result, this provision intimates an ap-
proach to protecting the environment that is only incidental to ameliorat-
ing human casualties. By inference, then, so long as military forces
avoid the threat of destroying human life, targeting the environment may
be legitimate.
Second, there is difficulty in ascertaining the scope of the protection
afforded under Article 23(g), which protects "property" of the enemy
120. Caggiano, supra note 5, at 486; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 98,
art. 23. The particular provisions provide:
[I]t is . . .forbidden -
(a) to employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
(g) to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.
Id.
121. 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 98, art. 23(g).
122. Caggiano, supra note 5, at 86-87.
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state. One commentator construed property, in its plain meaning, to
mean land and the immediate airspace. " Yet, this definition does not
necessarily provide coverage for the destruction of the upper atmosphere
or outer space.'
Finally, Article 23(g) gives way to the doctrine of military necessity.
For example, in the Second World War, the German General Lothar
Rendulic adopted a scorched earth policy in Norway in order to evade
advancing Russian troops."n General Rendulic ordered the evacuation
of all inhabitants in the province of Finmark, and destroyed all villages
and surrounding facilities."n The Nuremberg Military Tribunal charged
General Rendulic with wanton destruction of property, but later acquitted
him on the basis that military necessity justified his actions in light of
the military situation as he perceived it at the time.'"
2. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
The Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the protection of civilians
provides a similar scope of protection of property as its Hague counter-
part."= According to Article 53, "[a]ny destruction by the Occupying
123. See Simonds, supra note 74, at 171 (describing how international law defines
property as land and airspace, but makes no rule regarding outer space).
124. See WVesting, supra note 13, at 647-50 (discussing how the significance of
this proposition is based on the possibility of atmospheric modification, whereby com-
batants may attempt to control weather patterns and other atmospheric factors such as
ultraviolet protection over enemy territory by tampering with their physical properties).
125. Robert E. Jordan H, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VARFARE: THE VIET-
NAM EXPERmNCE 54, 57 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975).
126. Id.
127. See United States v. List, XI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals 757, 1295-97 (1946-49) (stating that although, in retrospect, General
Rendulic may have erred in his assessment of military necessity, he was not guilty of
a criminal act because the doctrine of military necessity may be justified by one's
reasonable assessment of the situation).
128. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 53, 75 U.N.T.S. 31-83 (1950), reprinted in DOCutENTS,
supra note 61, at 290 [hereinafter Civilian Protection Convention]. After World War
II, much of the turmoil surrounding the war confirmed the need to fashion a new set
of guidelines because former codifications failed to provide adequate protection. Id. In
many ways, the former codifications failed to provide clear and sufficient terms; in
those areas where relative clarity existed, violations nonetheless continued. Id. In
1949, a diplomatic conference in Geneva approved four conventions whose central
purpose was the protection of victims of war. Id. The four Geneva Conventions deal
with the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
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Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively
to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities .... is
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely neces-
sary by military operations."'29 Furthermore, Article 33 of the Conven-
tion prohibits the pillage of property and outlaws reprisals against pro-
tected individuals and their property. 30
The deficiencies of this Convention are similar to those found in the
1907 Hague Convention with its inclusion of similar language on the
doctrine of military necessity, which effectively provides an adequate
justification for the suspension of the prohibitions in Article 53. A fur-
ther limitation on the scope of the prohibition, the inclusion of the qual-
ifying phrase "occupying power," exacerbates the defect. The plain
meaning of this phrase limits the prohibition of Article 53 to those
instances when a state is actually within or "occupying" another state.
As one commentator has noted, the prohibition does not provide cover-
age for instances of aerial bombing because arguably, the enemy force
is not "occupying" the target state."
B. PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Despite its central focus on the protection of victims of armed con-
flict, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) provides a modem approach to
protecting the environment. ' The Protocol's provisions restricting war-
the Field, the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Id. The Fourth Convention pertaining to
the protection of civilians is relevant to this Article.
129. Civilian Protection Convention, supra note 128, art. 53.
130. Id. art. 33.
131. Leibler, supra note 27, at 106.
132. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977
reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 389 [hereinafter Protocol I]; DOCUMENTs,
supra note 61, at 387. Following the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in
1949, developments in the character and modes of warfare led to the realization that
the international laws of armed conflict required further adaptation. Id. By the late
1960s, efforts to reaffirm and develop a new set of rules made headway under the
auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Id. By 1977, the
strides made by the ICRC and various conferences led to the adoption of two Proto-
cols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: (1) relating to the protection of victims of
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fare provide: (1) protection of objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population;' (2) protection of works and installations con-
taining dangerous forces;'34 and (3) general protection of the natural
environment. 35
1. Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian
Population
In its provision of protection to "objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population," Article 54 of Protocol I states that
belligerents "may not attack, destroy, remove or render useless" those
indispensable objects." Article 54 explicitly enumerates a list of tar-
gets that are protected, including "foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops,
livestock, [and] drinking water installations."'37
To the extent that belligerents follow these prohibitions, some degree
of environmental protection results. Article 5, however, qualifies these
prohibitions.' First, the language of the Article protects only those
objects that are indispensable to "the survival of the civilian population."
This qualification is significant because, by inference, belligerents may
legitimately destroy those objects or facets of the natural environment
that are not necessary for the survival of the civilian population. 3
international armed conflict; and (2) relating to the protection of victims of non-inter-
national armed conflicts. Id.
133. Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 54.
134. Id. art. 56.
135. Id. arts. 35(3) and (55).
136. Id. art. 54(2).
137. Id.
138. Protocol I, supra note 132, arts. 54(3) and 54(5). Articles 54(3) and 54(5)
provide in part that
54(3) The prohibitions ...shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it
as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which
may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or
water as to cause its starvation or force its movement . ..
54(5) In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in
the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohi-
bitions ...may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under
its own control where required by imperative military necessity.
Id.
139. See Leibler, supra note 27, at 107 (arguing that objects indispensable to the
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Such legitimate purposes may include the destruction of the environment
to prevent its use as cover, or to hinder an advancing enemy force."
Paragraph 3 offers another exception. Those objects such as crops and
livestock that enemy forces use may be lawfully destroyed, so long as
the objects are solely for the use of members of the enemy armed forc-
es or "in direct support of military action."''
The inclusion of the military necessity doctrine presents a third limit-
ing factor. Paragraph 5 effectively permits a party under threat of con-
flict within its own territory to devastate its own environment out of the
exigency of external invasion. Similar to military necessity, there is no
bright-line test to determine the quantum of necessity to justify the
destruction of the environment. 42 Arguably, a party may conduct envi-
ronmental destruction within its own territory under an apparent or im-
minent threat, absent actual invasion.
The narrow interpretation of Article 54's substantive language limits
the scope of environmental protection. This is further exacerbated by the
inclusion of the military necessity doctrine.
2. Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces
Article 56 provides protection to "[w]orks or installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations.'"' Moreover, the Article specifically provides that such ob-
jects "shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of danger-
ous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian popula-
tion."1
44
The protection afforded to these specified installations leaves little
room for divergent interpretation. Paragraph 2 provides various scenarios
in which military forces may attack these objects. Accordingly, the
special protection shall cease:
sustenance of armed forces would be outside the scope of Article 54); Simonds, supra
note 74, at 175-76 (interpreting Article 54 to allow destruction of civilian objects for
purposes other than their survival).
140. Leibler, supra note 27, at 107.
141. Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 54(3).
142. See discussion supra Section II.B. (asserting that the doctrine of military ne-
cessity is often used to justify exceptions to the laws of armed conflict).
143. Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 56.
144. Id.
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(a) For a dam or dyke only if it is used for other than its normal func-
tion and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations
and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(b) For a nuclear generating station only if it provides electric power in
regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such
attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(c) For other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these
works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and
direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible
way to terminate such support." s
The minimum threshold the Article requires in order for the installations
to be legitimate targets can be parsed from these provisions. First, the
installations must be used in regular, significant, and direct support of
military operations. Second, the method of attack must be the only
feasible means of terminating that support. Moreover, it is clear from
the language that in the case of dams and dykes, an additional element
must be met: the enemy forces must use the installations for purposes
other than their normal functions.
The optimistic stance of Article 56 is not without criticism. First, the
language limits the scope of its coverage to those types of installations
the Article enumerates. As a result, oil wells and pumping stations, as
well as chemical and biological weapons production facilities, are ex-
empt from protection. The significance of this oversight is evident from
the intentional destruction of these types of installations in the Gulf War
by Iraqi and Coalition Forces.' Furthermore, at least one commentator
has suggested that Article 56 has not yet gained acceptance as custom-
ary international law."
145. Id. art. 56(2).
146. See McClintock, supra note 103, at 636 (providing examples from the Persian
Gulf War of aerial attacks on chemical and biological weapons producing facilities).
Destruction of these volatile facilities likely produced grave effects for the surrounding
environment, including the unintentional release of noxious agents. Id. at 637-38.
Furthermore, as the author points out, other potential targets such as nuclear and
agriculturallindustrial chemical facilities present the same types of dangers as targeted
biochemical weapons factories. Id.
147. Leibler, supra note 27, at 108-09. The author points out that in order to be
incorporated into customary practice, there must be evidence of "constant and uni-
form" practice by States in abiding by these prohibitions. Id. Furthermore, support for
this proposition is found in the fact that many States have had reservations to the
adoption of Protocol I, thus frustrating an argument to the contrary. Id.
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As a result, Article 56 provides limited protection to the natural envi-
ronment. Given the narrow interpretation of the provision's language,
and the implicit inclusion of the military necessity principle, combatants
have wide latitude in targeting objectives which may adversely affect the
environment.
3. General Protection of the Natural Environment
Protocol I, unlike its predecessors, makes explicit mention of environ-
mental protection in substance. Article 35(3) states that "it is prohibited
to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment."'" Similarly, Article 55 states that:
[C]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.49
To understand the significance of these provisions, this section dis-
cusses their importance relative to the context in which they are placed.
Article 35 is placed within the scope of the permissible methods and
means of warfare. In its most basic sense, this Article adopts the notion
that the methods and means available to combatants are not
unlimited. 5' Further adoption of customary principles governing the
waging of war is evident from the language of paragraph 2, which pro-
hibits "superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."'' Article 35(3),
placed within the context of these basic rules, supports an interpretation
of general protection of the environment, unlike Article 55 which is
placed within the framework of protecting the environment out of civil-
ian needs.
Article 55 is placed within the ambit of civilian objects.'52 The
scope of the Article applies to the general protection of civilian objects
defined in Article 52.'"3 Furthermore, Article 55 adds the qualifying
148. Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 35(3).
149. Id. art. 55.
150. Id. art. 35(1).
151. Id. art. 35(2).
152. Id. ch. III.
153. Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 52. Paragraphs 2 and 3 dictate that:
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language from its counterpart that prohibits destruction of the environ-
ment where "prejudice [to] the health or survival of the population" oc-
curs.
5 4
Given this dichotomy of environmental protection, that is, one dealing
with general protection, and the other concerning the indiscriminate
effects of environmental destruction on human populations, it is apparent
that Protocol I serves as a cornerstone of international cognizance for
the need to protect the environment. Furthermore, unlike its preceding
counterparts, Protocol I does not include language of military necessity,
thus precluding arguments of proportionality relative to military objec-
tives.
The inclusion of explicit articles that govern the protection of the
environment is not free of frailties, however. An examination of the
terms used in the relevant provisions reveals an ambiguity that is not
easily ameliorated. The text of Protocol I fails to define "widespread,"
"long-term," or "severe." One may want to apply similar interpretations
of these identical elements that the En-Mod Convention uses, but as the
Conference of the Committee for Disarmament in its Understanding has
dictated, such interpretations apply solely to En-Mod. 5 One commen-
tator suggested that an interpretation of the terms could be as follows:
(1) Widespread: encompassing at least an entire region of several hundred
square kilometers;
(2) Long-term: lasting at least several decades;
(3) Severe: causing death, ill-health or loss of sustenance to thousands of
people, at least at present or in the future.'5
(2) Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage.
(3) In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be pre-
sumed not to be so used.
Ild.
154. Id. art. 55.
155. See discussion supra Section I.B. (providing En-Mod's interpretations of
"widespread," "long-term," and "severe," but explaining that "En-Mod's interpretations
are not meant to be used in connection with any other international agreements").
156. Leibler, supra note 27, at Il1.
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Such attempts to characterize the terms, however, are unavailing. The
interpretation does not allow for general application, and a broader inter-
pretation is not representative of an international consensus.'57 The
difficulty in interpreting these terms is exacerbated because Protocol I
does not embody customary international law as indicated by the numer-
ous reservations that States have suggested upon signing the Convention.
Therefore, given the variance in interpretations and reservations, the
ambiguity of the language of Articles 35(3) and 55 remains unrecon-
ciled.
Another difficulty readily apparent from these provisions concerns the
threshold of materiality of military operations a party must transcend to
fit within the scope of prohibited activity. An examination of both Arti-
cles 35(3) and 55 reveals a conjunctive nature of the elements. There-
fore, in order for a material breach of these articles to occur, all three
elements, "widespread," "long-term," and "severe," must be present.
Furthermore, in terms of proscribing the use of biological and chemi-
cal weapons, commentators suggested that:
[Articles 35 and 55] will not impose any significant limitation on combat-
ants waging conventional warfare. [They are] primarily directed at high
level policy decision makers and would affect such unconventional means
of warfare as the massive use of herbicides or chemical agents which
could produce widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment.'58
Such a statement, however, is a fallacy because the drafters did not
intend the Protocol to apply to chemical, biological, and nuclear war-
fare.' 59
Protocol I has further insufficiencies. In many ways, the language of
the relevant Articles is ex post facto. Any claims of violations of Arti-
157. Id. For example, at accession to another protocol of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, France indicated that it was not acceding to Protocol I because of "the lack
of consensus among the signatory states of Protocol I as to the exact meaning of the
obligations .... " DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 464-65. Cf. George H. Aldrich,
Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1991) (theorizing that Articles 35 and 55 of
Protocol I, as it applies to non-nuclear warfare, will be quickly accepted as customary
law).
158. Simonds, supra note 74, at 175 (citing Michael Boothe et al., New Rules for
Victims of Armed Conflicts 348 (1982)).
159. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFr ADDITIONAL PROTO-
COLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949: COMMENTARY 2 (1973).
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cles 35(3) and 55 would arise only after the allegedly violative act has
occurred. Arguably, the language is flawed in that it does not provide
for preventive measures to curtail environmental damage. Moreover,
Protocol I, although sweeping in its coverage, has not risen to the level
of general acceptance by states needed to constitute a customary princi-
ple. Major signatories to Protocol I, including the United States, ex-
pressed reservations to its provisions, and in many cases, these states
have failed to ratify the Convention."w In order for the provisions to
apply to those States that are not parties to the document, therefore,
further evidence of adoption of the provisions into customary interna-
tional law is necessary.
C. ADDITIONAL PROTECTION: THE INHUMANE WEAPONS CONVENTION
The 1981 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Inhumane
Weapons Convention) is an extension of the spirit of the Geneva Con-
ventions and the 1977 Protocols because it focuses on the protection of
civilian life. Its Preamble reiterates Article 35(3) of Protocol I, thus
providing further evidence of environmental concern in times of armed
conflict.' The scope of this particular convention is different from its
predecessors, in that it covers specified modes of conventional warfare
within its component protocols."
Of particular interest is Protocol [UI of the Inhumane Weapons Con-
vention, which prohibits the use of incendiary weapons. The focus of
these provisions, however, relates to the protection of human life, rather
than explicit protection for the natural environment. As a result, protec-
tion of the environment is merely incidental. For example, Article 2(4)
provides that "[i]t is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant
cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such
160. Protocol I, supra note 132, Reservations. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 14
(commenting that the environmental provisions of Protocol I are "clearly new law(s]"
and that they do not yet embody customary international law).
161. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention-
al Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects, pmbl., 35 U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. AICONF 95115, Oct.
27, 1980, 19 LL.M. 1523, 1524-25 [hereinafter Inhumane Weapons Convention].
162. There are three Protocols to the Inhumane Weapons Convention on: (I) Non-
Detectable Fragments; (2) Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices; and (3) Prohibitions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons. Id.
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natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or
other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives."'63
The language evidences various deficiencies that have plagued prior
codifications of the laws of armed conflict. For example, military neces-
sity qualifies the prohibition on the use of incendiary weapons."
Moreover, the definitions of "incendiary weapon" itself are limited.
According to Article I, "'incendiary weapon' means any weapon or
munitions which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause
bum injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combina-
tion thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered
on the target."'6  Article l(b)(ii), however, limits the definition of an
incendiary weapon.66 Accordingly, this limitation implies that there are
certain weapons with incendiary effects that this Protocol allows, so long
as their ultimate effects are not directed toward human targets. Article
2(3) further supports an interpretation excusing environmental despoil-
ment, allowing the destruction of any military objective "separated from
the concentration of civilians."'67 Moreover, military necessity allows
proportional destruction in order to meet targeted objectives, thus allow-
ing a degree of destruction to the environment.'
68
D. SUMMARY
The preceding sections illustrate the extent to which the international
laws of armed conflict apply to environmental protection. In many in-
stances, ambiguity in language and problems of interpretation provide
163. Inhumane Weapons Convention, supra note 161; Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, art. 2(4), 19 I.L.M. 1534, 1535
(1981) [hereinafter Protocol on Incendiary Weapons].
164. See Simonds, supra note 74, at 178 (discussing the military necessity excep-
tion for the use of incendiary weapons).
165. Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, supra note 163, art. 1.
166. Id. art. 1(b)(ii). The limitation on what is considered an incendiary weapon
is:
(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects
with an additional incendiary effect, such as armor-piercing projectiles, fragmen-
tation shell, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which
incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause bum injury to persons,
but to be used against military objective, such as armored vehicles, aircraft and
installations or facilities.
Id.
167. Id. art. 2(3).
168. Id. art. 2(4).
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loopholes combatants may use to justify destruction of the environment.
Most of the provisions provide only collateral protection, that is, the
existing protection is related only to the preservation of human life and
the amelioration of human suffering. Moreover, the concern of protect-
ing the environment in times of armed conflict has not sufficiently risen
to a collective conscience required to embody customary international
law. As a result, the relevant principles in the preceding conventions,
when compared to En-Mod, provide only additional limited restraints on
deliberate environmental modification through the use of chemical and
biological toxins. The following sections examine whether the laws of
war concerning the specific employment of those types of armaments
provide any supplementary restrictions on environmental damage.
IV. THE LAW OF WAR AND THE USE OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Due to the indiscriminate effects of chemical and biological weapons
(CBWs) upon their victims, States historically have regulated their use
in times of armed conflict.'" Prior to their use in the trenches of
Western Europe during World War I, the world community considered
the use of weapons emitting toxic gas unlawful.'" States have histori-
cally resorted to using these means of mass destruction, however, to the
detriment of the environment. As a result, this section examines each
form of weapon and the legality of its use, within the confines of con-
ventional and customary sources of international law, in order to un-
derstand whether deliberate environmental modification can be cur-
tailed.' Moreover, implicit in this inquiry is whether the relevant con-
ventions actually apply to the protection of the environment, or whether
environmental protection is merely incidental to preventing unnecessary
human suffering.
169. MCCOuBREY & WHrE, supra note 115, at 189.
170. Id at 245.
171. See Roots, supra notes 1 and 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing vari-
ois examples of environmental modification based on the introduction of chemical and
biological weapons). States, when conducting environmental modification, may attempt
to introduce these weapons into their strategy in order to achieve the desired results.
For example, herbicides and napalm are forms of chemical weapons that were used as
defoliants in Vietnam. Moreover, it has been suggested that there exists the possibility
of using biological toxins to alter the environment in enemy territory. Id.
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A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROSCRIPTION OF
CBWs IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT
The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg to the Effect of Prohibiting
the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime recognized the custom of
preserving humanity in times of armed conflict. As a result, the signato-
ries to this regulation engaged to mutually "renounce, in case of war
among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of
any projectile of a weight below 400 grams, which is either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances." ' The Interna-
tional Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, concluded
in Brussels six years later, provided a similar position.'
The Hague Convention of 1899 made first mention of the specific
prohibition of weapons having the sole object of diffusing asphyxiating
gases.' In addition to recalling the customary principle that the means
of warfare used by combatants is not unlimited, the Convention in Arti-
cle XXIII stated that:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is espe-
cially forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnec-
essary suffering;
172. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of
Certain Projectiles in Wartime, Dec. 11, 1868, partially reprinted in STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR 151
(1973) [hereinafter CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR].
173. International Declaration Concerning the Law and Customs of War, Aug. 27,
1894, partially reprinted in CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 151-52.
In pertinent part, Article XII provides that "the laws of war do not recognize in
belligerents an unlimited power in the adoption of means of injuring the enemy." Id.
Furthermore, Article XIII of the Declaration provides:
According to this principle are especially forbidden:
(a) Employment of poison or poisoned weapons;
(e) The employment of arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause
superfluous injury, as well as the use of projectiles prohibited by the Declara-
tion of St. Petersburg of 1868.
Id.
174. See McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 115, at 245 (discussing the prohibi-
tion of asphyxiating gases included in 1899 Hague Convention).
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Declare as follows:
The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gas-
es . . .175
The 1907 Hague Convention incorporated almost identical lan-
guage'
7 6
These prohibitions did not deter the use of gas warfare in World
War I. Following the war, outrage concerning the use of poi-
sonous weapons ensued.T As a result, the Treaty of Versailles
sought to reaffmn the unlawfulness of gas warfare by including in
Article 171 the notion that "[t]he use of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being
prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden
in Germany.
B. THE GENEVA GAS PROTOCOL
The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare (Gas Protocol), concluded in Geneva, stands
as the first major codification that curtailed the use of biological
weapons." Its provisions reiterated the prohibition on the use of
175. First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899 Acts, July 29, 1899,
reprinted in CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172. at 152.
176. See Second International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907 Acts, Oct. 18,
1907, reprinted in CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 153 (providing
restrictions on States for armed conflict).
177. MCCOuBREY & WHiTE, supra note 115, at 245. According to one commenta-
tor, the resort to such armaments was a means to remedy the infantry stalemate that
had developed in Western Europe. Id.
178. Id.
179. Treaty of Peace with Germany at Versailles, June 28, 1819, reprinted in
CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 153.
180. Maj. Bernard Schafer, The Relationships Betveen International Laws of Armed
Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Con-
duct Are Permissible during Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 287, 303 (1989). The
terms "bacteriological" and "biological" are interchangeable when discussing this type
of armament. One source defines these weapons as "living organisms, whatever their
nature, or ineffective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease
or death in man, animals, or plants, and which depend for their effects on their abili-
ty to multiply in the person, animal, or plant attacked." Howard S. Levie, Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Weapons, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STuDIEs 1991: THE LAw
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poisonous weapons as its predecessors had done. The Gas Protocol,
however, added the additional limitation "[t]hat the High Con-
tracting Parties ... agree to extend this prohibition to the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as be-
tween themselves according to the terms of this declaration."''
Despite its seemingly broad coverage, this general prohibition on
the use of bacteriological weapons in times of armed conflict is
subject to several deficiencies. First, the Gas Protocol's terms allow
considerable room for varying interpretations. States have argued as
to whether tear-gas and other normally non-lethal gases, as well as
herbicides and similar agents, fall within the scope of the prohibi-
tion. '8 In 1975, in connection with the ratification of the Gas
Protocol by the United States, the U.S. government asserted that
the scope of the Protocol did not extend to riot-control agents and
chemical herbicides.
8 3
A second deficiency in the Gas Protocol concerns the number of
States that have become parties subject to reservation. Generally,
the overriding reservation was that the Protocol would only be
binding on a State, so long as other States respected the prescribed
prohibitions." 4 Given this reservation, the Gas Protocol is not a
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 331, 342 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1992).
181. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poi-
sonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 140 [hereinafter the Geneva Gas Proto-
col].
182. DOCUMENTS, supra note 61, at 137. The British government issued a memo-
randum in 1930 regarding tear-gas, bringing attention to this ambiguity. Id. According
to its interpretation of the language, Britain took the position that tear-gas was proper-
ly within the scope of the Gas Protocol. Id. France iterated a similar position. Id. at
137-38. The United States, however, did not share this view. Id. at 138. The United
States based its position on an argument that it would be inconsistent to prohibit the
use of tear gas in times of international conflict, when the use of such "weapon" was
allowed in domestic law enforcement. Id. Interestingly, in 1970, the British govern-
ment announced a reinterpretation of the Protocol concerning tear-gas, and this time
changed its position holding that tear-gas was not significantly harmful to man "in
other than wholly exceptional circumstances." Id.
183. See id. at 138 (describing U.S. optimism to include riot control agents and
chemical herbicides within the scope of the 1975 Gas Protocol).
184. Id. at 145. For example, France, with whom many States sided, proclaimed
that:
(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the French Re-
public as regards States which have signed or ratified it or which may accede
to it.
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per se restriction on the use of biological weapons as it purports to
be. Rather, its function lies in its ability to deter the first use of
the weapon.
Given the large number of States currently bound by the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol, the prohibitions on the use of biological
weapons could be a source of customary international law.'"
States have met such a position, however, with considerable dis-
sent." Much of this debate has centered on the character of the
reservations to the Protocol, as well as the variations in interpreta-
tion which have reduced its usefulness as a practical guide for
customary international law, such as whether the Protocol covers
non-lethal toxic weapons.'" Yet, at the very least, the world com-
munity generally accepts the notion of prohibiting the first-strike
use of these classifications of weapons."
Moreover, the spirit of the Gas Protocol has produced a legacy
which seeks to limit the production and stockpiling of biological
and similar toxic weapons." The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention) fashioned a formidable regime where
States agreed never to develop, produce, or stockpile:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.'
(2) The Said Protocol shall ipso facto cease to be binding on the Government
of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or
whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.
Id. at 144.
The United States took a similar position. DocUmmNTS, supra note 61, at 145.
185. Id. at 138.
186. Id. at 139.
187. Id.
188. Schafer, supra note 180, at 303.
189. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Feb.
25, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 309 (1973).
190. Id. art. I.
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Furthermore, the Biological Weapons Convention provides for means by
which member States shall dispose of currently stockpiled biological
weapons. 9
C. APPLICATION OF THE GAS PROTOCOL TO
THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Considerable debate surrounds the scope of application of the Gas
Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. The focus of the
debate rests on whether the provisions apply only to the use of biologi-
cal weapons against human beings or whether it also prohibits attacks
on animals and plants."9 The norms and standards imposed by the
laws of war dictate a baseline approach to the use of CBWs against the
environment.'93 Though these rules of war are not related to the Gas
Protocol, they nevertheless may provide some guidance to the legitimate
targeting of the environment, regardless of the mode of weaponry
employed.'94 In order to advance the inquiry, this section examines two
independent factors: the legitimacy of environmental targets; and the
legitimacy of the use of biological weapons against those specified tar-
gets.
9 5
In terms of legitimacy of targeting, belligerents in enemy territory
may destroy vegetation which hampers their operations or threatens their
security."9  Yet, this general rule may have limited exceptions.
Belligerents may not destroy indispensable products, such as foodstuffs
if the civilian population suffers from their destruction."9 There are,
however, cases in which belligerents may justifiably destroy these tar-
gets, such as when the enemy uses the products for the furtherance of
191. See id. arts. EIl-IV (requiring States to eliminate stockpiles of biological
weapons).
192. See CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 67 (discussing debate
over the scope of protection offered by international agreements).
193. See discussion supra Section III (discussing the Law of War as it relates to
environmental protection).
194. CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 68. The international com-
munity regards this practice as a form of economic warfare; this concept is related to
the destruction and the definition of legitimate bombing targets. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See discussion supra Section I.B.1. (discussing the relevance of the doctrine
of military necessity).
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military operations. One such example is the "scorched earth" strate-
gy- 198
Various forms of "crops" are viewed as legitimate targets. For exam-
ple, Article 53 of the Hague Regulations refers to war munitions, which
"may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals."'" War
munitions include "industrial crops," such as rubber, timber, and cot-
ton.' If destruction of these products is legitimate in the industri-
al/raw material stage, then the destruction of these products in their
natural environment can also be justified."'
This same argument applies to economic crops considered not as
sustenance for the population of the enemy country, but as goods in-
tended for monetary exchange, such as sugar and coffee. Applying logic
similar to the above case, the seizure and destruction of these products
in their finished stage would be legitimate. Therefore, eventual destruc-
tion of these goods in the growing stage arguably would also be permit-
ted.'
Given this reexamination of the legitimacy of environmental targets in
armed conflict, the next threshold inquiry addresses whether biological
weapons are permissible armaments in warfare. 3 The language of the
Gas Protocol may provide some insight. Though the scope of coverage
of chemical weapons is slight, the use of the generalized phrase "bacte-
riological methods of warfare" suggests little room for any restrictive
interpretation. In other words, the Protocol prohibits the use of biologi-
cal weapons, regardless of whether the target is human or plant. The
United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly adopted resolutions
calling for strict observance of the Gas Protocol principles.' The most
198. See discussion supra Section II.A.I. (discussing the legal terms of propor-
tionality and discrimination in the context of the law of war).
199. 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 98, art. 53.
200. CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 68.
201. Id. at 69.
202. Id.
203. Section II examines the legitimacy of the environment as a target in wartime.
The purpose of this brief exposition is merely to remind the reader that the environ-
ment can be the subject of armed conflict.
204. G.A. Res. 2162B (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 10, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in CBW AND THE LAW Or: WAR, supra note 172, at
166. For example, Resolution 2162B (XXI) adopted on December 5, 1966 called for.
(1) Strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Proto-
col for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.., and condemns all ac-
tions contrary to these objectives.
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significant of these is Resolution 2603A (XXIV), adopted on December
16, 1969, which evidences an intent to include protection for the envi-
ronment. 5 Moreover, the position of member States buttresses this no-
tion. For example, according to the Polish delegate to the Gas Protocol,
"[b]acteriological warfare can also be waged against the vegetable world,
and not only may corn, fruit and vegetables suffer, but also vineyards,
orchards, and fields. ''206
The provisions of the Gas Protocol, and the Biological Weapons
Convention apparently curtailed the potential for using these forms of
weapons to modify the environment deliberately.2" These prohibitions
have not deterred States from resorting to these types of weapons."8
Continued research relating to recombinant DNA leading to the forma-
tion of "supergerms," and the conversion of harmless micro-organisms to
lethal toxins capable of mass production at low costs in clandestine
facilities has renewed concerns of a return to usage of biological weap-
ons.0
Id. See CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 166-68 (reiterating similar
positions in a myriad of resolutions: 2454A, 2662, and 2827A).
205. G.A. Res. 2603A, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969), reprinted in, CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 167.
Resolution 2603A states in pertinent part:
Considering that chemical and biological methods of warfare have always been
viewed with horror and have been justly condemned by the international com-
munity,
Considering that these methods of warfare are inherently reprehensible because
their effects are often uncontrollable and unpredictable and may be injurious
without distinction to combatants and non-combatants ...
Declares as contrary to international law:
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare--chemical substances, whether gas-
eous, liquid or solid-which might be employed because of their direct toxic
effects on man, animals or plants;
(b) Any biological agents of warfare-living organisms, whatever their
nature, or infective material derived from them-which are intended to cause
disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects
to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.
Id.
206. CBW AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 172, at 71.
207. See Schafer, supra note 180, at 303-04 (discussing the efforts the Gas Pro-
tocol and Biological Weapons Convention made to ban biological weapons in war-
fare).
208. See id. at 303 (indicating that no custom concerning refraining the possible
use of biological weapons exists); RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW
129 (1989) (stating that there exists indications of renewed reliance on the possibility
of utilizing biological weaponry).
209. FALK, supra note 208, at 129. Moreover, evidence shows that the United
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At least one commentator offered further criticisms of the established
regime."' First, peaceful applications of biological toxins can no lon-
ger be reliably distinguished from potential military applications!"
Moreover, the secrecy of research in this area obscures the distinction
between innocent research and more sinister intentions." As a result,
these problems with the regime make verification and compliance with
the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention difficult."3
In summary, the preceding examination of the limitation of the use of
biological weapons indicates that protection of the environment may
exist. Fortunately, States have never used biological weapons on a wide-
scale level in armed conflict."4 Nevertheless, the importance lies in
recognizing the plausibility of using such armaments for deliberate envi-
ronmental modification purposes,"' especially because States have not
States has renewed support for research in the biological warfare area, including ex-
perimentation and development of biological agents possessing a medical purpose as
well as military purposes. Id. Professor Falk has indicated that government-supported
research budgets have increased since 1980, reaching S100 million in 1983. Id. at
130. As justification for these measures, the author has suggested that much of the
activity was in response to possible Russian research and development, evidenced by
the Sverdlovsk explosion in 1979 in which the apparent release of anthrax spores into
the atmosphere caused casualties. Id. See The State, Society, and the Evolution of
Warfare in the Middle East: The Rise of Strategic Deterrence?, WASH. Q., Autumn
1995, at 53 (examining reliance on chemical and biological weapons by Middle East-
ern States); U.N. Official Wants More on Iran Biological Weapons, ORLANDO SEN-
TDNE, Sept. 17, 1995, at A18 (reporting the deficiency of data released on the extent
of Iraq's biological weapon development that the United Nations requested in order to
disarm the country); James Hackett, Lethal Germs in the Arsenal, WASH. TES, Sept.
19, 1995, at A14 (commenting on the need to use threats of nuclear weapons retalia-
tion on those countries willing to use chemical or biological weapons).
210. FALK, supra note 208, at 135 (acknowledging the weakness of the Biological
Weapons Convention to enforce mechanisms preventing further biological weapons
development).
211. See id. (suggesting that Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention,
which limits the use of agents that have no justification for prophylactic, protective,
or other protective purposes, creates a loophole capable of being reconciled with al-
most any path of research).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 135-36 (noting the reluctance of nations to disengage in non-mili-
tary research in order to insure that biological weapons research will not continue).
214. See Schafer, supra note 180, at 304 (stating the potential environmental dam-
age from chemical and biological warfare).
215. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (analyzing the future military
use of toxic chemicals to alter the weather conditions of enemy territory).
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completely ceased the development of and possible reliance on these
weapons.
D. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Chemical weapons employment has spawned a debate as to the legali-
ty of their use.2"6 The use of herbicides during the Vietnam War led to
the determination that activities such as defoliation" 7 of forests in
times of armed conflict emerged as a viable issue in terms of deliberate
environmental modification." 8 Accordingly, the following section ex-
amines whether the recently-proffered Chemical Weapons Convention
provides adequate mechanisms to prevent intentional modification of the
environment in times of armed conflict.
Initially, military operations used herbicides to defoliate jungle
growths to gain better views of enemy movements, but later found addi-
tional uses. These uses include defoliating friendly base perimeters in
order to prevent sneak attacks; defoliating lines of communication to
prevent ambushes; defoliating enemy base areas to force enemy troop
movements; and destroying crops in order to divest the enemy of suste-
nance." 9 The defense of using these chemical agents rests on the
ground that neither the Gas Protocol nor customary international law
prohibits employing herbicides."0 This basis leads to the conclusion
that the use of herbicides does not violate any of the general norms of
the laws of armed conflict if the environmental destruction has a valid
216. See Levie, supra note 180, at 334 (defining chemical warfare agents as
"chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants").
217. See Howard S. Levie, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE: THE VIET-
NAM EXPERIENCE, supra note 125, at 158 (considering defoliants as agricultural chem-
icals that poison or desiccate the leaves of plants, causing them to shed their leaves
or die).
218. See Roots, supra note 1, at 27 (opining that such activities should be dealt
with under the En-Mod Convention).
219. See Levie, supra note 217, at 158 (discussing the progressive use of herbi-
cides as a weapon during the Vietnam War).
220. Id. at 159. The author suggests two basic arguments that have been proffered
but discredited. The first argument is that because States widely use herbicides do-
mestically to control weeds and other unwanted vegetation, the Gas Protocol could not
have been meant to cover the use of these chemical agents. The argument is spe-
cious, especially when applied to international law. The second argument is that the
Gas Protocol did not mean to cover herbicides because they were not developed until
a later date. This argument has been discredited as insignificant due to the language
of the Gas Protocol. Id.
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military purpose and if the combatants identify the targeted crops for the
use of enemy forces. " Alternatively, one author suggested that the
laws should draw a distinction between defoliation and crop destruc-
tion.m In either case, the central issue involves a determination of
whether States can control the effects of using herbicides that are either
lethal or injurious to the health of combatants or the civilian popula-
tion.m Thus, if States can control the chemical agents as such, the
agents shall be deemed lawful."
The result of several decades of debate is the formation of a regime
to control reliance on chemical weapons.' In January 1989, 149
221. See id. at 160 (suggesting the use of alternative methods that reduce the
environmental risks of herbicides).
222. Robert NV. Tucker, in LAw AND RESPONSIMrrY IN WARFARE THE VmTNAM
EXPERIENCE, supra note 125, at 168.
223. See id. at 169 (stating that the controlled use of herbicides would allow for
lawful application without fear of health hazards).
224. Id. Moreover, the United States has almost uniformly taken the position that
no customary international law prohibits these weapons. Levie, supra note 180, at
340. For example, the Law of Naval Warfare stated that:
The United States is not a party to any treaty ... that prohibits or restricts
the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases .... Although the use
of such weapons frequently has been condemned by states, including the United
States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction estab-
lished by a treaty, a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their
use.
Id. With the ratification of the Geneva Gas Protocol, it would seem that such a posi-
tion is no longer warranted. President Gerald Ford on April 8, 1975, however, signed
Executive Order 11,850 which provides:
The United States renounces, as a matter of policy, first use of herbicides in
war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control
of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate
defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in de-
fensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situation in areas under
direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners
of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to
mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated
areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and
paramilitary organizations.
Id. at 340-41.
225. See Marian Nash (Leich), Chemical Weapons Convention, 88 A, t. J. INT'L L
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States convened at the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. The States represented were parties to the original Gas Proto-
col and other interested States.1 6 The meeting culminated in the pro-
mulgation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their De-
struction (Chemical Weapons Convention). 7
The Preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention seeks to reaffirm
the principles of the Gas Protocol as well as the Biological Weapons
Convention. Moreover, the Chemical Weapons Convention "[d]etermined
for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the
use of chemical weapons." Article I declares that:
Each State Party . . . undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited ... under this Convention. 8
The significance of the Chemical Weapons Convention is found in its
definitions and criteria. For instance, it defines "chemical weapons," as
among other things, "toxic chemicals and their precursors" and "muni-
tions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other
harm ... "229 Further, the Chemical Weapons Convention defines a
toxic chemical as "any chemical which through its chemical action on
life process can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent
harm to humans or animals." 230
323, 323 (1994) (stating in U.S. President Clinton's letter of transmittal the tremen-
dous international struggle involved in negotiating this treaty); DOCUMENTS, supra note
61, at 139 (stating that the first use of chemical weapons is a violation of customary
international law).
226. See DOCuMENTS, supra note 61, at 137 (discussing State parties to the Paris
Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).
227. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13,
1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N. Doc. A/47/27, App. I (1992),
reprinted in SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 307
(Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson eds., 1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
228. Id. art. I (emphasis added).
229. Id. art. II.
230. Id.
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What is especially meaningful in the above criteria is an implicit
interpretation that environmental damage falls within the scope of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The types of prohibited weapons are not
only those designed to cause death, but also those which can cause
"other harm," presumably including "harm" to the environment.' The
fact that Article I explicitly prohibits the use of chemical weapons "un-
der any circumstances" supports this conclusion.' Furthermore, the
Preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention recognizes that there
exists "[a] prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and rele-
vant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method
of warfare." ' 3
The problem, however, is whether a state will stop using chemical
weapons with the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. One
argument suggests that the prohibition of the use of herbicides and other
chemical agents has become a fixed principle in customary international
law. Yet, the issue involves the validity of this position. As stated
earlier, military operations have defended the use of herbicides in armed
conflict on various grounds." Moreover, the fact that the Inhumane
Weapons Convention provides various circumstances in which it deems
the use of defoliants lawful in times of war suggests the Inhumane
Weapons Convention does not completely prohibit the use of herbi-
cides.' Thus, the opposing positions concerning the legality of herbi-
cides in times of warfare makes a fixed principle prohibiting the use of
chemical weapons difficult to assess.'
Finally, the Chemical Weapons Convention is simply not in force. 3
231. See id. (defining the munitions and devices prohibited from release due to
their toxic chemical content).
232. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 227, art. I.
233. Id. pmbl.
234. Schafer, supra note 180, at 301-03.
235. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 55-56 (stating that the use of herbicides can be
defended on the ground of military necessity).
236. See supra section III.C (discussing the Inhumane Weapons Convention and
the purported loopholes that exist thereby allowing lawful use of herbicides in armed
conflict).
237. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes a cus-
tomary principle in international law).
238. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 227, art. XXI (stating that:
"[The] Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening
for signature"). As of January 1, 1995, 158 States had signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention and only 16 had ratified it. REPORT RELATvE TO CHBE,.CAL AND Bio-
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Due to domestic debate and opposition, ratification of the Convention
has proceeded slowly.2
E. SUMMARY
The preceding sections illustrate the current international regimes
concerning the use of biological and chemical weapons in times of
armed conflict. Thus far, on the one hand, it appears that States have
curtailed the use of biological armaments. As a result, States are unlike-
ly to resort to weapons of mass destruction for environmental modifica-
tion purposes. Evidence exists, however, that some States have not
ceased research and development of biological weapons. Therefore, it is
useful to understand the weapons' potential for widespread environmen-
tal damage, and the relevant international laws of armed conflict govern-
ing their use."
On the other hand, proscriptions on the use of chemical agents for
environmental modification purposes are not entirely in place. States
have expressed reservations to prior codifications of the laws of war
allowing for the use of herbicides and other non-lethal chemical weap-
ons. Although the newly-fashioned Chemical Weapons Convention may
sharply curtail the weapons' application, until the Convention enters into
LOGICAL WEAPONS - MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, S. Doc. No. 31, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2821 (1995). On November 23, 1993, President William J. Clinton submitted
the Convention to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
Id. On July 1, 1995 the Netherlands became the 30th State to ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Netherlands Signs Treaty Banning Chemical Weapons, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, July 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
239. See, e.g., Frank Gaffney Jr., Chemical Weapons Treaty or Travesty?, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at A17 (arguing that the Chemical Weapons Convention should
not be ratified since it is unlikely that it will curtail the proliferation of chemical
weapons); Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the Chemical Weapons Convention Should Not Be
Ratified, in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 52 (Brad Roberts ed.,
1994) (stating that weak verification methods within the Convention do not ensure
absolute compliance and thus reduction of chemical weapons); Baker Spring, Chemical
Weapons Convention: A Bad Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1994, at A30; see also
Barbara Crossette, Chemical Treaty Appears on Hold in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1995, at A12 (indicating that ambivalence exists in the United States Senate on
passing the Chemical Weapons Convention); Chem Weapons: Senate Won't Ratify
Treaty in 1995, GREENwIRE, Sept. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (articulating that it is unclear whether States will reach the 1995 tar-
get date of implementation).
240. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing the possible uses of
biological toxins for deliberate environmental modification purposes).
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force, it is uncertain whether conventional or customary sources of inter-
national law legally forbid the employment of chemical weapons for
purposeful environmental modification. The following section addresses
the problems that have plagued the international laws of armed conflict
and offers various remedial measures given the limited protection afford-
ed to the environment.
V. REMEDYING THE PROBLEM
As the preceding sections have illustrated, present codifications of the
laws of war and relevant customary principles of international law pro-
vide limited environmental protection in times of armed conflict. Yet,
those precepts provide many exceptions leading to the legitimate suspen-
sion of the laws of war. Due to ambiguity of terms and lack of enforce-
ment, States' environmental destruction goes unprosecuted. In order to
meet the right of a habitable environment for the use of humanity, new
standards, norms, and enforcement vehicles need to be fashioned.
A. CRIMINALIZATION OF GEOCIDE
Customary law seems to have recognized the utilitarian value of a
habitable environment. In the international forum, many environmental
agreements provide for penal sanctions against those who violate their
prohibitions."' Yet, one commentator advocates that a per se inter-
national crime of "geocide" is evolving."z
The language of "geocide" would have to expand upon the definition
of genocide and borrow similar language from the Convention on Pre-
vention and Punishment of Genocide of 1948."3 This would not only
include the mens rea standard of criminal law, but also include knowl-
edge with substantial certainty from tort law.Z" As a result, this new
language would deem destruction of any facet of the global ecological
system a crime on an international level.
241. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,
June 1, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 251; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Flora and Fauna, March 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085; Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 656.
242. See Berat, supra note 27, at 340-42 (stating that there is a moral imperative
to create the crime of geocide to prevent the destruction of the environment).
243. Id. at 342.
244. Id. at 343.
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Criminalizing deliberate environmental modification appears to be a
viable alternative, in terms of diminishing state actions in times of
armed conflict, as well as enforcing state responsibility. In many ways,
the Gulf War provides an example of international concern over the
environment's intentional modification.145 Following the War, in June
1991, the London Conference on Environmental Protection and the Law
of War stated that Iraq be held liable for the destruction of the envi-
ronment under the international laws of armed conflict, a reiteration of
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.'
Given the international concern for environmental damage, on what
bases should States criminalize environmental modification or deem it a
method of geocide? One reason would be to deter conduct. By increas-
245. See Maj. Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict Dur-
ing the Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 37 A.F. L. REv. 41, 68 (1994) (concluding
that the Coalition's failure to punish Iraq for war crimes signaled to the international
community that the law of armed conflict is unenforceable); James S. Robbins, War
Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18-FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 45, 54 (1994) (claim-
ing that ecocide, that is, crimes against the environment, reflects the tenors of time
rather than traditional principles of the laws of war); Marc A. Ross, Comment, Envi-
ronmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat Intention-
al Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 515, 539 (1992) (advocating
that the Gulf War's experience should be an impetus for a convention outlawing
ecological warfare); Sharp, supra note 4, at 66 (claiming that the massive and vindic-
tive environmental destruction by Iraq during the Gulf War violated the laws of war,
however, there is no identifiable forum to prosecute their crimes); Col. James P.
Terry, Operation Desert Storm: Stark Contrasts in Compliance with the Rule of Law,
41 NAVAL L. REV. 83, 92 (1993) (noting that the extensive and international damage
to the environment by Iraq represents the kind of wanton destruction that the laws of
war are trying to proscribe); McClintock, supra note 103, at 686-90 (arguing that the
most effective way to enforce the crime of geocide is through a convention, which
can provide a forum for contracting parties to prevent and punish violators under
international law); Wilcox, supra note 100, at 314 (suggesting that international sanc-
tions should be sufficiently severe to deter environmental terrorism).
246. See PLANT, supra note 119, at 3-36 (stating that Iraq's action caused interna-
tional outrage that led governments to consider creating international laws to protect
the environment). Cf. Amb. Philippe Kirsh, The London Conference on Environmental
Protection and the Law of War, in VERFYING OBLIGATIONS, supra note 1, at 156.
Security Council Resolution 687 states that:
Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2
August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources . . . as a result of Iraq's unlaw-
ful invasion and occupation of Kuwait . ...
Resolution 687, UN. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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ing the costs and penalties of environmental modification, States may
comply. 47 Moreover, by criminalizing deliberate environmental modifi-
cation, there is the potential for providing an effective means of ensur-
ing state responsibility.2" Any one of the following characteristics
would qualify a geocide convention as belonging to the field of inter-
national criminal law: (1) explicit or implicit declaration of certain con-
duct as a crime under international law; (2) criminalization of the con-
duct under national law; (3) providing for the prosecution or extradition
of the alleged perpetrator;, (4) providing for punishment of the individual
found guilty; (5) reference to an international criminal jurisdiction; and
(6) exclusion of the defense of superior orders.2'* Furthermore, by es-
tablishing a generalized crime of geocide, governing bodies may penal-
ize not only the State, but also the individual actorn 0
By establishing an international crime of environmental destruction,
the quantum of proof that is necessary, or the threshold of damage that
must occur, is relatively low compared to En-Mod and Protocol I where
higher thresholds of damage must be met."' By introducing an ele-
ment of intent to the crime, the deliberate nature of environmental modi-
fication would render the State culpable for its conduct. Therefore, any
damage, regardless of the degree, whether widespread, long-term, or
severe, would automatically render the perpetrator, either the State
and/or its military, criminally liable.
At least one convention on geocide has been proposed in which de-
liberate environmental modification is a concern, the Proposed Conven-
tion of the Crime of Ecocide. m According to this Convention, ecocide
includes intent to use biological and chemical weapons against the envi-
ronment; the use of herbicides in order to defoliate and destroy forests,
soil degradation; and the use of weather modification techniquestm
247. Stephen C. McCaffery, Crimes Against the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL
CRmINAL LAW, CRmS 543 (M. Cherif Brassiouni ed., 1986).
248. See Berat, supra note 27, at 343-44 (recommending that persons subject to
geocide liability include rulers, public officials, and private individuals as well as
corporations).
249. M. Cherif Brassiouni, Penal Characteristics of International Criminal Law, 15
CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 30 (1983).
250. Berat, supra note 27, at 344 (noting that private citizens should also be lia-
ble for geocide).
251. Cf. Simonds, supra note 74, at 210-15 (commenting that lowering the thresh-
old of liability to a realistic level is one way of making States responsible for the
destruction of the environment).
252. FALK, supra note 208, at 187.
253. Id. at 189 (proposing that the use of bombs in such quantity as to affect
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Moreover, this Convention proposes that any person, including "respon-
sible rulers, public officials, military commanders, or private individu-
als," may be charged with ecocide, conspiracy to commit ecocide, at-
tempt to commit ecocide, or complicity. 4 The Convention is silent on
the necessary quantum of damage. Thus, it appears that any damage is
sufficient to trigger the proposed convention's penalties."5
Establishment of an international crime of geocide and enforcement of
a viable regime of environmental protection can diminish deliberate
modification of the environment. Merely enforcing an approach, as
found in the Proposed Convention of the Crime of Ecocide, can elimi-
nate, in many respects, the problems of ambiguous language, divergent
interpretation, existing loopholes, and limited enforcement. It remains to
be seen, however, whether States would openly accept such an ap-
proachY 6
B. ESTABLISHING A FIFrH GENEVA CONVENTION
As the preceding sections indicate, the international laws of armed
conflict provide only collateral protection for the environment. The frail-
ties of the relevant provisions suggest that protection of the environment
is an incidental function of protecting human lives. Moreover, ambiguity
in the language of environmentally centered conventions such as En-
Mod, reveals limitations on the scope of the protection afforded. As a
result, another remedy to ameliorate damage to the environment would
be to establish a new corpus of laws of war designed to abolish the
inherent problems in the current set."
adversely the quality of soil, or the use of techniques to modify weather and climate
as a hostile act against a foreign state, should be punishable under international law).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 190 (noting that contracting parties agreed to enact laws necessary
to give effective penalties to persons charged with ecocide or acts enumerated in Arti-
cle III and citing the Proposed Convention on the Crime of Ecocide, arts. VI and
VII).
256. Cf. George H. Brauchler, Jr., Comment, United States Environmental Policy
and the United States Army in Western Europe, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 479 (1994) (examining the applicability of the United States National Environ-
mental Policy Act to actions by the U.S. armed forces abroad). "Any proposal that
places greater restrictions on the freedom of the U.S. military to respond and act
abroad must be evaluated in light of the impact of the additional burdens placed on
the military's stated mission and goal." Id. at 489.
257. See PLANT, supra note 119, at 37-42 (clarifying what exists is a necessary
part of deciding upon and advocating what needs to be done by way of international
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The London Conference, convened in June 1991, sought to establish a
"Fifth Geneva" Convention on the Protection of the Environment in
Time of Armed Conflict and fashion a new frameworkY The general
premise behind this new Convention was due to the deliberate environ-
mental damage that occurred in the Persian Gulf War. This new frame-
work would restate and consolidate the relevant rules of customary law
concerning state responsibility by updating the current laws of war, as
well as improving the language of the conventional sources of Geneva
and Hague laws. s9 Although the author did not define the term "envi-
ronment," one commentator suggested that the new Convention would
deal with "damage to the marine environment as a whole and marine
wildlife and habitats in particular, pollution of the atmosphere, destruc-
tive climate modification, enhanced global warming and degradation of
the ozone layer, and the destruction or degradation of terrestrial fauna
and flora and their habitats."
In order to eliminate differing quanta of damage necessary, several
options have been considered:
Option (a): prohibiting the employment of methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause any (except de minimis)
damage to the environment;
Option (b): prohibiting it at least where the damage is widespread, long-
lasting or severe;
Option (c): prohibiting it as under alternative (b), but adding a fourth
alternative criterion, 'significant (or 'appreciable') and irreversible';
Option (d): choosing some midway position between alternative (b) and
the existing excessively high threshold as it appears in Article 35(3) of
Protocol I. t
One commentator suggested that option (c) may be the best approach
because the threshold of damage required is sufficient to encompass
most damage, but high enough so as not to impose liability for any
law).
258. Id.; Kirsh, supra note 246, at 151.
259. Kirsh, supra note 246, at 151-52.
260. PLANT, supra note 119, at 41-42 (noting that the impetus behind this Con-
vention is concerns that arose during the Gulf War).
261. Id. at 45; Protocol I, supra note 132, art. 35(3). Protocol I's standard re-
quires widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage. See discussion supra
Section II.B.3 (discussing Protocol I's prohibition of methods that result in the de-
struction of the natural environment).
1996]
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
damage. 2 Assuming that option (c) is appropriate, the drafters must
eliminate the ambiguity of these terms.263
A Fifth Geneva Convention must also clearly define the types of
weapon it will ban. Since environmental modification may be brought
about using several types of weaponry (conventional or of a type caus-
ing mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons), a
clear restriction on the use of these armaments is necessary because, as
the laws of armed conflict have indicated, loopholes exist that also
allow States to use these weapons.' 4
Another problem that the Fifth Geneva Convention must address is
the notion of military necessity. The subjective nature of this principle
has caused the suspension of the application of the current set of inter-
national laws of armed conflict.2 ' Providing military commanders with
a more objective criteria in appraising what constitutes proper military
targets may solve this problem.2" Yet, such a remedy is not likely, or
imminent."
262. PLANT, supra note 119, at 48 (defining "irreversibility" as "the loss of eco-
systems, species or genetic material or the diversity thereof in a given area which
could have a serious impact upon the ecology of the region or of the world as a
whole").
263. Id. at 47 (suggesting that the Jefinitions provided by the CCD Understanding
to En-Mod be adopted for the purposes of uniformity). See discussion supra Section
I.B (discussing how the various interpretations of the language causes States to fail to
ratify the Convention resulting in non-compliance of the Convention).
264. Part III of the proposed Fifth Geneva Convention focuses on the use of some
weapons which may be deemed excessively injurious to the environment. The use of
these weapons was more circumscribed than in the present weapons convention. The
Fifth Geneva Convention, however, does recognize that there are very limited purpos-
es for defoliants and herbicides including small-scale use to assist in preparation of
air-strips, harbors, and camps, as well as areas in which ambush is possible. Id. at
52.
265. Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in ENVmON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR 78, 79, 92-94 (Glen Plant ed., 1992)
(claiming that military necessity has been subjectively defined in wartime and has pre-
vailed over customary international law).
266. Cf. Cmdr. Charles A. Allen, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force:
The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39, 45
(1992) (stating that strategic planners are advised to select targets that cause the least
danger to civilian lives and civilian objects).
267. Id. (doubting whether belligerents would refrain from attacking an important
military target because they do not possess the weapons to avoid incurring collateral
damage).
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In summary, a Fifth Geneva Convention may be able to address some
ambiguities contained in the current set of international laws of armed
conflict; however, the Convention must be wary of the infirmities that
have plagued its predecessors, such as ambiguity in terms, divergence in
interpretations, and lack of enforcement. Only when the Convention
explicitly defines the terms, prohibits specific methods employed, and
provides objective criteria for military targets, can States eliminate de-
struction. Until States establish a new legal regime on warfare, however,
environmental protection in times of armed conflict remains limited.
CONCLUSION
The international laws of armed conflict provide the environment with
a degree of protection in times of modem warfare. Yet, as the Article
has illustrated, that protection is, at best, limited. In many instances,
military necessity and the preoccupation with ameliorating human suffer-
ing have outweighed environmental concerns. As technology evolves,
and the means and methods of warfare become more advanced, States
have found that the environment itself may be manipulated through the
use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological
armaments, to achieve efficient military operations and desired outcomes.
It is with this foreboding reality that States must reaffirm and reformu-
late current regimes to protect the environment.
A basic tenet behind international environmental law is the notion of
state responsibility for environmental destruction. The Stockholm Decla-
ration and its progeny have extended that principle to the waging of
modem warfare, but with marginal success. Customary international law,
the laws of war, and their corresponding weapons conventions diminish
the importance of this responsibility and of ultimate liability. This Arti-
cle has examined the problems in the current regimes and has proffered
various remedial measures.
States must recognize the extensive ecological damage that deliberate
environmental modification causes. The current corpus of laws, however,
does not furnish a clear understanding of this potential. States must
reconcile divergent interpretations and ambiguous terms in conventions
such as En-Mod and Protocol I to provide States with clear guidelines
for military operations.
States have diminished their reliance on biological toxins, and as a
result, the use of such weapons for purposeful environmental modifica-
tion may be unlikely. Yet, States cannot confidently assert a similar
statement about chemical armaments. Differing opinions on the legality
of their use reveals the possibility of resorting to those weapons for
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environmental modification purposes. The Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, however, may provide a remedy. Establishing an explicit proscrip-
tion on the employment of chemical agents in armed conflict may estab-
lish a distinct customary principle of international law. Signatory States
should ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention to prevent extensive
environmental damage by purposeful modification and through the use
of chemical weapons.
Finally, the adoption of the Fifth Geneva Convention on the Environ-
ment can support the curtailing of deliberate environmental modification
and the strengthening of an environmentally protective regime. Such a
Convention would ameliorate the infirmities of the current set of laws of
armed conflict by pronouncing clear standards for military operations
and defining quanta of proof of environmental damage. Moreover, the
Convention should incorporate facets of the Proposed Convention of the
Crime of Ecocide to provide definite criminal elements and ultimate
criminal liability. Increasing the economic and penal costs can alter state
action and behavior. These steps can ensure compliance with state re-
sponsibility for deliberate environmental modification in times of armed
conflict.
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